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3 
Foreword 
This paper is the second of a series of publications that use a newly developed EU start-
up calculator. This is a simulator that allows to assess the disruptive impact of COVID-19 
on start-up activity and ultimately aggregate employment in the European Union Member 
States. The paper explains the tool and performs scenario analysis for Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden. After a general introduction and 
explanation of the tool, the presentation of the scenario analysis of each country is self-
contained. This allows the reader to focus directly on the countries of interest. 
The first report, Benedetti Fasil, Sedláček and Sterk (2020), presents a similar structure 
and discusses the scenario analysis for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy and 
Spain. This paper will be followed by a third and last report that will analyse the 
remaining Member States for which EuroStat data are available.   
The start-up calculator has been firstly developed by Sedláček and Sterk (2020) and 
applied to the US economy. It has subsequently been adapted to fit the employment 
profile of young firms in individual EU Member States. 
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Abstract 
Early data show that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected particularly strongly start-up 
business activity. This may have dramatic and lasting effects on aggregate employment 
which persist as the cohort of new firms age. To assess such an impact, we developed 
the EU start-up calculator. A first application targeted to Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy and Spain is discussed in Benedetti Fasil, Sedláček and Sterk (2020). The 
EU start-up calculator is an empirical tool that allows to conduct scenario analysis to 
compute the impact that the disruption of start-up activity has on aggregate employment 
on EU Member States and their economic sectors. In this paper, we simulate the effects 
of a strong (i.e. of magnitude equivalent to the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009) but 
short-lived (i.e. lasting one-year) crisis in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden. This shock generates important and persistent job 
losses in all the countries ranging between 0.9% (Portugal) and 4.5% (Latvia) from the 
employment trend in 2020 and results in a computed potential cumulative loss of jobs for 
the period 2020-2030 ranging from 59,000 (Estonia) to 798,000 (France). The potential 
negative impact is particularly high in Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal, as 
well as in the service sector, which are characterized by a high firm turnover and a 
reliance on start-ups and young firms for job creation. We also find that in most 
countries the deterioration of the survival rate of young firms plays an important role in 
driving employment, seconded by the number of new entrants. As a consequence, 
policies aimed at supporting young firms and incentivizing the creation of new ones may 
significantly mitigate the medium-term effect of the pandemic. In fact, when we simulate 
bounce-back scenarios where the number of firms entering the economy rapidly 
increases in 2021, in every country the outlook is significantly improved, the recovery is 
faster and the aggregate job loss is lower. 
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1 Introduction 
The EU start-up calculator is an empirical tool that allows researchers and policy analysts 
to compute an estimate of the medium-run impact, i.e. up to 2030, that COVID-19 may 
have on aggregate employment due to the disruption of start-ups and young firms. In 
the context of this study, start-ups are firms age zero or new entrants while young firms 
are less than six years old from when they registered as a business. The simulator allows 
to create different scenarios with the possibilities to vary three margins: (i) the number 
of start-ups, (ii) the survival rate of young firms and (iii) the growth potential of start-
ups (i.e. the post-entry growth of firms in terms of employment). The start-up calculator 
uses publicly available data from Eurostat allowing analysis of the whole economy, as 
well as the industrial and service sectors in each Member State.  
The focus is on the impact of COVID-19 on the employment-generating potential of start-
ups and young firms. This category of firms is particularly important for a dynamic and 
productive economy. Start-ups and young firms are job creators and account for a large 
share of employment in the EU Member States (Figure 1). At the EU 27 level, 35% of 
firms are less than 5 years old and account for 12% of total European employment, with 
start-ups accounting for 2.5%. Figure 1 shows that in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Portugal, young firms are particularly relevant actors in terms of their contribution to 
aggregate employment when compared to the EU average. In fact, among these 
countries the share of employment of young firms ranges between 14% in Estonia and 
21% in Latvia. Even more striking is the disproportional contribution of start-ups and 
young firms to employment growth. In the EU 27, young firms accounted for 36% of 
employment growth in the period 2013-2017. This pattern is qualitatively present also in 
the other European countries analyzed which show a contribution of young firms to 
employment growth ranging between 25% in Denmark to 48% in France. Particularly 
interesting is the case of France where the employment share of young firms is close to 
the EU average while the contribution of young firms to aggregate employment growth is 
13 percentage points higher than the EU average. Figure A1 in Appendix I reports the 
same descriptive statistics for a larger set of EU Member States.  
Figure 1. Importance of start-ups and young firms for aggregate employment 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020. 
Note(1): The time series for the EU27, Denmark and Finland is between 2012 and 2017, for Estonia, France, 
Latvia and Portugal between 2008 and 2017, for Lithuania from 2009 to 2017. The Business Demography 
dataset for Sweden does not have enough data to compute the start-up and young firm contribution to growth. 
Hence, this is omitted in the Figure. For the other statistics the time series is between 2012 and 2017. 
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Importantly, start-ups are also pivotal for the creation of new jobs. Figure 2 shows net 
job creation (i.e. creation minus destruction) by firm age, in the same set of countries. 
On average, the employment share of start-ups accounts for 1.8 in Denmark to 3.6% in 
Latvia of aggregate employment. Thus, a lack of start-up activity can lead to an 
important loss of aggregate employment. Figure 2 also shows that for firms of age 1 the 
contribution to net-job creation is substantially lower and even negative for Denmark. 
Beyond age 1, net job creation is negative in all the countries. That is, these age groups 
on average destroy more jobs (either via exit or scaling back) than they create. Again, 
this highlights the importance of start-ups in sustaining aggregate employment. Finally, 
the figure suggests that there is substantial variation across countries in the importance 
of start-ups for job creation, although qualitatively the patterns are similar. The 
interested reader can refer to Figure A2 in Appendix I to assess the net job creation in a 
larger set of EU Member States. 
 
Figure 2. Importance of start-ups for job creation 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020. 
 
At the same time, start-ups (i.e. firms age 0 in Figure 2) and young firms find 
themselves in a fragile stage of their firm life-cycle being more susceptible to disruption 
of supply chains, a drop in demand for their products or services, limited access to 
funding and more stringent regulations. For this reason, the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
consequences in terms of containment measures adopted, changes in consumer 
preferences, increased uncertainty and related economic crisis is deemed to impact 
particularly strongly on start-ups and young firms. This is confirmed by recent data on 
the number of new business registrations in the first semester of 2020 which show a 
sharp decline with respect to the same months of the previous year across several EU 
countries. Figure 3 shows how the number of new companies created declines in the first 
and second quarter of 2020 with respect to the first and second quarter of 2019, i.e. -
49.61% in Q1 and -54.36% in Q2 in Denmark, -10.01% in Q2 in Estonia, -2.1% in Q2 in 
Finland, -3.1% in Q1 and -18.44% in Q2 in France, -2.23% in Q1 and -1.52% in Q2 in 
Latvia, -1% in Q1 in Lithuania, and -23.94% in Q1 and – 46.07% in Q2 in Portugal 
(Figure A in Appendix I considers the annual variations for a larger set of EU Member 
States). These data hide large monthly drops in the number of new start-ups registered 
during the lockdowns and the consequent freeze of administrative activities. For instance, 
at the height of the first wave in France the number of start-ups dropped by almost 50%, 
in Estonia by 23%, in Lithuania by 41% and in Portugal by more than 70%, in all cases, 
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in April 2020 compared to April 2019.1 The only exception is Sweden which registers an 
increment in the number of new companies registered in the first two quarters of 2020 
with respect to the same period in 2019. Nevertheless, behind the positive trend, also 
the Swedish economy has registered a general slowdown in the economy and a decline in 
the number of new firms entering the market in April and May 2020 with respect to April 
and May 2019. In general, the resulting decline in job creation potential, due to the 
missing generation of start-ups, can have a dramatic and lasting effect on aggregate 
employment that persists as the cohorts of new firms mature (see Gourio et al. (2016) 
and Sedláček (2020)). 
 
Acknowledging that challenging times may spark radical innovations (e.g. teleworking, 
contact-tracing applications) and the creation of new successful enterprises, the COVID-
19 crisis is likely to affect negatively not only the start-up rate but also the survival rate 
of young firms and the growth potential of start-ups for which we do not have available 
data yet. In general, data show that start-ups and young firms have a much higher exit 
rate than older firms. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average survival rate of start-
ups during the first five years of activities. In particular, in the EU 27 about 20% of start-
ups exit the market during their first year of activity, 43% within three years and only 
about half survive for five years.2 Survival rates also vary considerably across countries. 
For instance, in Lithuania about 40% of start-ups exit during their first year while only 
one fourth survives longer than five years. This numbers are in sharp contrast with 
Sweden, which among the country sampled, shows the highest survival rates. In fact, 
about only 4% of start-ups exit the market during their first year and only 40% exit 
during the first five years of activity. Figure A4 in Appendix I shows the survival rates for 
a larger set of EU Member States. Furthermore, the literature suggests that the exit rates 
of young firms increase during downturns (e.g. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 
(2013)). Moreover, Sedláček and Sterk (2017) show that the growth potential of firms is 
linked to the business cycle. During business cycles job creation by start-ups and 
aggregate employment growth co-move and drop during recessions with a correlation 
between entrants employment and aggregate employment growth (GDP growth) of 0.36 
(0.45). Hence, firms born during recessions are in general smaller and tend to stay 
smaller during their life-cycle. This is indicative that companies like Uber or Airbnb, born 
during previous crisis, represent an exception rather than a rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
1 See Section 4 for further data on each country analysed in this paper. 
2 Also business survival rates for Europe provided by statista.com show a similar pattern: in 2017 almost one in 
five start-ups exited the market within the first year of operation, about 58% of new companies survived 
for three years and only 44% survived for five years. Some sectors, such as the IT sector seems to be 
particularly characterized by high exit rates. CBInsights.com reports that about 70% of tech start-ups fail 
within 20 months after obtaining financing, and about 97% of consumer hardware start-ups eventually fail.   
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Figure 3. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in the first and second 
quarter of 2020 with respect to January to April 2019 (percentage) 
Source: JRC, data from the Danish Statistical Institute (DST), Statistics Estonia (SE), Statistics Finland (SF), 
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee), the Enterprise Register of Latvia 
(https://www.ur.gov.lv/en/statistics/), Statistics Lithuania (https://www.stat.gov.lt), the Portuguese National 
Statistical Institute (INE), the Swedish Registration Offices of Companies (Bolagsverket). 
Note(1): The data, which come from national statistical offices or enterprise registers, are not harmonized 
across countries. As a consequence, Figure 3 does not allow for quantitative cross-country comparisons per se. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to visualize the different impact that COVID-19 has had across countries in terms of 
start-up creation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Y-o-y survival rate of start-ups 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020. 
 
Note(1): The Eurostat database provides the y-o-y survival rates for start-ups after one, two, three, four and 
five years of activities. The plotted percentages are the averages of the period from 2013 to 2017 for the EU 
27, from 2008 to 2017 for Estonia, France, Latvia, from 2008 to 2018 for Finland, France, Lithuania, Portugal 
and Sweden and from 2009 to 2017 for Denmark.  
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At this point of the COVID-19 pandemic it is not clear whether the current economic crisis 
will be short lived or sustained over a much longer period and if the implications for 
start-ups will be consistent with what has been documented during previous economic 
downturns.  For this reason, our baseline scenario assumes a strong but brief contraction 
with start-up activities affected negatively by the crisis, i.e. the number of start-ups, 
their growth potential and the survival rate of young firms drop for only one year to a 
level corresponding to that experienced during the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 (or 
drop to the minima of the underling Eurostat time series). This baseline scenario 
constitutes a plausible scenario and we postpone to further research the analysis of 
alternatives conjectures. According to the EU start-up calculator, this scenario would 
create substantial and persistent aggregate employment losses, especially in Estonia, 
France, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal. A full recovery to realign employment to its pre-
crisis trend may take about a decade, even if start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis 
level in one year.3 The outlook is considerably improved in every country if specific 
policies would be introduced in 2021 targeted at increasing the number of firms entering 
the economy. Likewise, policies aimed at increasing the survival rate of young firms 
would also be quite effective in mitigating the negative impact of the crisis.4 These 
results suggest that policy makers have ample space of manoeuvre for policies 
specifically targeting an easily identifiable category of firms, i.e. start-ups and young 
firms. Finally, in all the countries analyzed, the service sector may be affected more than 
the industry and manufacturing sectors, as young firms are important job creators in this 
sector. This also in the case in which the three margins are shocked symmetrically across 
sectors as the calculator embeds the employment structure of each sector considered.   
 
In what follows, Section 2 introduces the EU start-up calculator. Section 3 discusses the 
data used and the methodology adopted to create the simulator. Section 4 applies the 
calculator to simulate how the destruction of start-up activities affects aggregate 
employment in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and 
Sweden. Business dynamism and scenario analysis is discussed separately for each 
country. A cross-country comparison is deferred to when the tool will be available for a 
larger set of Member States. Section 5 concludes. 
                                   
3 The persistence of our results is aligned to similar simulations based on the OECD DynEmp3 Database 
performed by Calvino et al. (2020). They evaluate the impact on aggregate employment over 3 to 14 years 
of a 20% decline in the number of entering firms in a year as average across 15 countries.  
4 For instance, Germany is initiating a start-up program aiming at supporting and expanding venture capital 
financing, France has created a 4 billion euros fund to support young firms liquidity, Italy has created the 
programme “Smart&Start Italia” which allocates 100 million euros to refinance innovative start-ups, as well 
as 200 million euros to support venture capital financing. This adds to further programs aiding start-ups 
and young firms with training and couching and the 34 billion euros more generally assigned to support 
liquidity needs of SMEs. 
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2 What is the start-up calculator? 
The EU start-up calculator is an empirical tool which allows researchers and policy 
analysts to compute the medium-run impact, up to 2030, that COVID-19 has on 
aggregate employment due to the destruction of the activities of start-ups and young 
firms. In the context of this study, start-ups are defined as firms of age 0, i.e. newly 
registered firms, and young firms are those up to 5 years old. The calculator was firstly 
developed by Sedláček and Sterk (2020) for the US economy and then adapted to fit the 
employment profile of young firms in the EU Member States using publicly available 
Eurostat data.5  
 
The EU start-up calculator will be made publically available as a web-based tool in the 
coming months. A user will be able to easily simulate the time path for aggregate 
employment for a given scenario of start-up activity. Different scenarios can be created 
varying the following three parameters or “margins”6 (in economics parlance) related to 
entry, exit and growth of young firms which tend to worsen during a recession: 
 
i) the number of start-ups, i.e. shift the number of start-ups (for incoming 
cohorts).  
ii) the survival rate of young firms: i.e. shift the profile of firm survival rates by 
age (for all firms up to age fifteen). 
iii) the growth potential of start-ups: i.e. shift the profile of average size by age 
(for incoming cohorts). 
A decline in the number of start-ups directly translates into a decline in the number of 
new jobs created and hence employment. Furthermore, this lost generation of firms 
creates a persistent dent in aggregate employment as subsequent years will be 
characterized by a lower number of firms (see for instance Gourio, Messer, and Siemer 
(2016) and Sedláček (2020)). The survival rate of young firms is directly linked to their 
exit rate. In general, start-ups and young firms are more fragile than established 
incumbents. This fragility is exacerbated during recessions - see Haltiwanger, Jarmin, 
and Miranda (2013). An economic consequence of this pandemic is expected to be a 
higher exit rate of young firms, a lower firm survival rate and, thus, more job 
destruction. Finally, the growth potential of start-ups entering the economy in 2020 is 
expected to decline. Firms that are born during a recession start smaller and tend to stay 
smaller even when the economy has recovered as shown by Sedláček and Sterk (2017). 
Changing the growth potential margin will result in shifting downwards the entire growth 
of the employment profile of the cohort of companies entering the market in 2020. 
 
When creating a scenario changing the three margins, the calculator computes the 
implied time-dependent changes in aggregate employment for the given country and 
sector from 2020 to 2030 and the cumulative job loss. The flexibility of the tool permits 
the user to analyse the overall employment effects or outcomes by country and sector 
resulting from different degrees of severity of the economic impact that COVID-19 has on 
start-ups and young firms. The scenarios can reflect V-, U-, W- or L- shaped recessions 
with the analysis being comparable across economic sectors and countries. The user 
should constrain the flexibility of the tool with knowledge of the possible impacts of 
COVID-19 on the three margins are likely to be in order to analyse plausible scenarios.   
 
                                   
5The start-up calculator for US is available at the following website 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econ0506/Main/StartupCalculator.html 
6 where a marginal change is a relaxing or tightening of constraints or the response which this relaxation or 
tightening produces 
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3 Data and methodology 
The EU start-up calculator is tailored to individual Member States. It allows scenarios to 
be analysed for the whole business economy, the industrial sector, the manufacturing 
sector and the service sector.7 It uses data from Eurostat Business Demography 
Statistics on the number of firms, persons employed, average size and survival rate of 
cohorts of firms for the age bins 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and all covering the years from 2008 to 
2017 for Estonia, France, Latvia and Portugal, from 2009 to 2017 for Lithuania and from 
2012 to 2017 for Denmark, and Finland. It considers data of only employer businesses, 
that is businesses that have at least one employee.  
 
The data for 2018 and 2019 are extrapolated for each age group assuming that the 
survival rates, the firm sizes and the number of start-ups linearly converge to their 2008-
2017 average.8 Similarly, the age profile of firm size and survival rate between age 6 and 
15 for the years 2008 to 2017 are interpolated to obtain values per age bin that reflect 
trends consistent with the aggregate average values per age bin and year. The age 
profile of the number of firms older than 5 years is then simply obtained using the 
information on the interpolated yearly survival rate per age bin 6 to 15. Firms older than 
15 are unaffected by the three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect 
the analysis. This implies that the simulations should be considered as lower boundaries 
given that they do not take into account the impact of the crisis on firms older than 15. 
Finally, the different scenarios are simulated from 2020. The calculator allows analysis of 
bounce-back scenarios to capture the case in which the three margin would recover 
strongly, i.e. above the time series average, from 2021, for instance due to a policy 
intervention. See Appendix II for technicalities behind the interpolation extrapolation and 
creation of scenarios.  
 
The start-up calculator allows also to adjust the simulations taking into consideration 
general equilibrium effects, i.e. potential employment reallocation towards surviving and 
older firms, which are driven by a lower wage rate caused by the decline in start-up 
employment. To this end the calculator is embedded in a standard heterogeneous firm 
model, which allows to connect the calculator with the literature on firm dynamics.9 In 
models with firm heterogeneity, firms are distributed over different levels of productivity, 
unproductive firm exit the economy and are replaced by new entrants, while households 
consume and supply labour to firms. The interested reader can find in Appendix II the 
derivations formalizing the embedding of the calculator in a general equilibrium model 
with firm dynamics. When the COVID-19 pandemic hits the activity of start-ups and 
young firms, the general equilibrium reallocation mechanism dampens the effect. The 
disruption of start-up and young firm activities results in lower employment and a lower 
wage rate. Firms that remain in the market hire more labour partially absorbing the 
negative shock on employment. The magnitude of the equilibrium dampening effect 
depend on the labor supply and demand elasticities. In the EU start-up calculator, the 
elasticities are consistent with the literature and with the values adopted by the European 
Commission QUEST and RHOMOLO models. In particular, the labour supply elasticity is 
set at 0.25 and the labour demand elasticity at -0.1. These elasticities result in a 
dampening effect of 29% (see Appendix III).10 
                                   
7 The sectoral aggregation analysed reflects the classification available in Eurostat. That is, business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector 
of the business economy except activities of holding companies.  
8 In the case of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Eurostat data for the survival rate start in 2013. The short time 
series does not allow us to have 5 years to construct the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the 
minimum, maximum and average value of the survival rate are the same number. 
9 As a reference to the canonical model of firm heterogeneity see Hopenhayn (1993) and Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1995). 
10 The elasticities chosen result in a conservative dampening effect. When setting the elasticities at values more 
commonly used in the macroeconomic literature, such that for the labour supply elasticity and –0.246 for 
the labour demand elasticity (Lichter et al. (2015)), the dampening effect reduces to 20%. In light of the 
large range of elasticities discussed in the literature the calculator features easily changeable elasticities 
enabling for robustness checks.  
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4 Country analysis 
 
4.1 EU start-up calculator: Denmark 
4.1.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate, higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU start-up calculator, these developments are likely to create 
substantial aggregate employment losses, of up to -1.4% of aggregate 
employment in 2020. The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 
could be up to 97,000. 
• Effects are very persistent: full recovery may take more than a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year.  
• More than half of the aggregate employment loss is accounted for by the 
reduction of the survival rate and about 40% by the reduction in the number of 
start-ups. Policies targeted to support young firm survival and promote new firms’ 
entry would seem to be the most effective. The outlook is improved if in 2021 
there is a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the economy. i.e. the 
cumulative aggregate employment loss is reduced to 62,000. 
• The Danish service sector may be affected relatively strongly, as young firms are 
particularly important job creators in this sector. In all three sectors more than 
40% of the job loss is due to a decline in the survival rate of young firms.  
4.1.2 Business dynamism in Denmark 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Danish firms, see Table I.  
	 Table I. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Denmark 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 11.7% 8.7% 7.8% 12.2% 
survival rate 92% 91.9% 91.6% 93.6% 91.9% 
share of young firms 36% 36.6% 28.5% 25.4% 38% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 1.6% 0.7% 0.6% 1.8% 
employment share of young firms 12% 8.5% 3.6% 3% 9.4% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2012 to 2017. 
 
The statistics show that, when it comes to entry and exit of firms, the Danish economy 
has a higher start-up rate than the EU average. A seemingly important share of job 
creation is attributed to start-ups and young firms, although lower than the EU average. 
Over the sample, about 8% of firms exit within a given year, whereas the start-up rate is 
about 12%. Start-ups (firms of age zero) account for about 1.6% of aggregate 
 
14 
employment whereas firms up to age 5 together account for more than 8%.11  When 
looking at the sectoral disaggregation, the service sector contributes to most of the 
business dynamic of the overall economy with a start-up rate of above 12% and an 
employment share of start-ups of almost 2%. 
The creation of new companies has been affected by the crisis showing an overall 
contraction in the first months of 2020 with respect to the same period in 2019. This 
contraction is especially driven by the drop in the number of new start-ups with at least 
one employee.12 Despite the fact that the negative trend in the number of new 
companies registered is present already before the pandemic, its effects are quite 
marked. In particular, Figure 5 shows how the number of new companies created drops 
in March by 32%, in April by 33% and in May by 23%, stabilizing to about -10% in June 
and July, in each case compared to the corresponding month of 2019. Hence, also 
Denmark has suffered from an important disruption of start-up activity due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The “unborn” start-ups may cause important repercussions for 
aggregate employment, especially if the number of start-ups recovers slowly and may be 
further affected by a second wave of the epidemic and a potential slowdown of the 
economy.  
 
 
Figure 5. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Denmark 
Source: JRC, provisional data on the total of new companies registered are provided by the Danish Statistical 
Institute (https://www.dst.dk) 
 
 
 
 
                                   
11 Table I also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a large 
component of the former.  
12 See the article “Antal nystartede virksomheder endnu ikke pa niveau med 2019” by Jorgensen (2020) 
available at: https://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/eksperimentel-statistik-covid-19#erhverv. Note that 
Jorgensen statistics of the period from April to July vary only slightly to the one reported in this report. The 
difference is attributed to the treatment of the data done by the Danish statistical office which considers 
only companies with VAT registration and that do not close within 14 days from the registration. 
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4.1.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above. Specifically, we 
assume that the number of start-ups and the growth potential fall from the sample 
averages to the sample minima (which were reached in the years following the financial 
crisis of 2008), while the survival rate drops considerably13, see Table II.14 Moreover, we 
assume that this decline lasts for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins 
are assumed to be back at their sample averages. The scenario is the one of a strong but 
short-lived crisis expecting that once the containment measures are lifted, the economic 
activity of start-ups and young firms will resume. This expectation seems to be 
consistent with the recent economic trend.  
Table II. Scenario assumptions - Denmark 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -25% -25% -25% -25% 
Growth potential -6% -30% -30% -6% 
Survival rate -10% -10% -10% -10% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
Figure 6 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by just 
over 1.4%. The recovery is slow: by 2026, aggregate employment is still more than 
0.4% below the level it would have attained without the disruption of start-up activity. 
The employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 96,850. Accounting for equilibrium 
adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 29%, leaving a cumulative employment 
loss of about 69,180 (blue line in Figure 6). The decline in the survival rate accounts for 
about half of the effect. The number of start-ups accounts for about 40% and the growth 
potential for roughly 9%. These findings provide an important input for the policy 
discussion. The three different margins can be influenced by targeted policies. Potential 
employment benefits of policies targeted towards firm survival and to promote firm entry 
suggest to be highest. However, the cost of different policy options needs to be taken 
into account.  
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table I shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are 
somewhat more dynamic. This sector has higher start-up and exit rate, and a much 
higher employment share of start-ups and other young firms. 
Figure 7 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. The service sector 
shows a larger employment loss, even though the decline in the three margins assumed 
is actually somewhat smaller, in particular in the shock to the growth potential (Table II). 
This result is driven by the fact that the service sector is more dynamic in terms of entry 
and exit and therefore reliant on young firms to provide employment. 
                                   
13 In the case of Denmark, Eurostat data for the survival rate start in 2013. The short time series does not allow 
us to have 5 years to construct the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, maximum and 
average value of the survival rate are the same number. 
14 Note that in Table II Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to their sample minima which 
happens to be the same for the number of start-ups. However, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have 
impacted particularly strongly the service sector imposing strict lockdown measures to sectors such as 
transport, tourism, and hospitality. Alternative scenarios that take into account this asymmetry can easily 
be computed as soon as sectoral data become available.  
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Figure 6. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Denmark 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Denmark, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and growth 
potential equal to their sample minima and of one year duration, for the survival rate it is arbitrarily assumed to 
be of -10%. The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Denmark are available from 2012 to 2017. The 
short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, maximum 
and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the plot related to the shock 
to the survival rate). Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their time-path does not 
quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate employment taking into 
account general equilibrium effects.  
  
Figure 7. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - Denmark 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Denmark, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and the 
growth potential equal to their sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration, for the 
survival rate it is arbitrarily assumed to be of -10%. The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Denmark 
are available from 2012 to 2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a 
consequence, the minimum, maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number 
(yellow line in the plot related to the shock to the survival rate). Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects.  
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Table III. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins - Denmark 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 97 k 13 k 10 k 75 k 
# Start-ups 40% 30% 30% 40% 
Growth potential 9% 36% 36% 10% 
Survival rate 51% 42% 40% 50% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Denmark, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young firms affects the service sector 
relatively strongly causing a loss of aggregate employment of more than 75,360 jobs 
(Table III). In all the three sectors more than 40% of the job loss is attributed to the 
decline in the survival rate of young firms, while the decline in the number of start-ups 
account for more than 30%. In the industry and service sector the decline of the growth 
potential explains an important part of the overall employment loss as a consequence of 
a larger magnitude of the shock affecting this margin. These considerations are indicative 
that policy targeted to support firms to tackle survival challenges and support entry could 
have a significant effect in mitigating the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have 
on aggregate employment. 
The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021 especially if supported by specific policies targeted to 
start-ups that could reduce the entry barriers, promote innovation and relax financial 
constraints. The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-ups is 
simulated in Figure 8 where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-ups is 
increased in 2021 to the maximum level registered in the time series. After an initial 
sharp decline in aggregate employment, the increased number of start-ups entering in 
2021 causes an improvement of the employment trend and a lower cumulative job loss 
totalling to about 62,450. Thanks to the better outlook aggregate employment reaches 
its pre COVID-19 level by 2026. This is due to the fact that the number of start-ups 
account for a large share of the impact on aggregate employment, i.e. about 40%, of the 
total effect on employment (see Table III). 
 
 
 
18 
 
Figure 8. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Denmark 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Denmark, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and the 
growth potential equal to their sample minima and of the duration of one year, for the survival rate it is 
arbitrarily assumed to be of -10%. The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Denmark are available from 
2012 to 2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the 
minimum, maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the plot 
related to the shock to the survival rate) The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place 
in 2021, to be equal to the sample maximum and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by 
the three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the 
impact on aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
 
4.2 EU start-up calculator: Estonia 
4.2.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate, a higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU Start-up Calculator, these developments are likely to create 
an important aggregate employment loss, of up to -1.5% of aggregate 
employment in 2020 and up to -1.6% in 2021. The cumulative employment loss 
for the period 2020-2030 could be up to 59,000. 
• Effects are very persistent: full recovery may take more than a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year. 
• The decline in the number of start-ups accounts for almost two-thirds of the 
employment loss, while the decline in the survival rate for almost 25%. Policies 
targeted to reduce exit of young firms and incentivise entry would seem to be the 
most effective in Estonia. The outlook is significantly improved if in 2021 there is 
a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the economy, i.e. the cumulative 
aggregate employment loss is reduced to 22,000. 
• The Estonian service sector may be affected particularly strongly, as young firms 
are particularly important job creators in this sector. 
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4.2.2 Business dynamism in Estonia 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Estonian firms, see Table IV. The statistics show that, when it comes to 
firms’ entry and exit, Estonia is dynamic and relies on start-ups for job creation. Over the 
sample, more than 8% of firms exit within a given year, whereas the start-up rate is 
about 12%. Both values are higher than the EU average. Start-ups (firms of age zero) 
account for about 2.7% of aggregate employment (similarly to the EU average) whereas 
firms up to age 5 together account for more than 14%, which is slightly higher with 
respect to the EU average of 12%. The importance of start-ups and young firms is 
evident in the service sector where young firms account for more than 40% of the total 
number of active firms and for more than 16% of total employment, whereas in the 
industry and manufacturing sectors young firms account for about 1% of employment.15 
As a consequence, we expect that effect of the disruption of start-up activity due to 
COVID-19 will be particularly high in the service sector.  
 Table IV. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Estonia 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 11.7% 7.9% 8.1% 12.3% 
survival rate 92% 91.4% 93.8% 93.6% 91.1% 
share of young firms 36% 40.7% 29.7% 30.6% 42% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 2.7% 1% 1.1% 3.1% 
employment share of young firms 12% 14.4% 6.8% 7.3% 16.6% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat –i.e. all business economy except 
the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of the 
business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2008 to 2017. 
 
Moreover, provisional data provided by Statistics Estonia show an increasing contraction 
in the number of new businesses created since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic 
with respect to the same period in 2019. In particular, 22.7% less businesses were 
created in April, and 8.9% less in May, in each case compared to the corresponding 
month of 2019 (see Figure 9). Interestingly, in June and July 2020 the number of start-
ups shows a bounce-back increasing by 4.2% and 2.5% with respect June and July 2019. 
If this trend persists the Estonian start-up scene may recover relatively quickly from the 
negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Acknowledging the possibility of a rapid 
recovery in the number of start-ups during the second half of the year, these statistics 
show an important disruption of start-up activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
can have important repercussions for aggregate employment, especially if a second wave 
of the pandemic may result in interventions that may restrict again economic activities.   
 
                                   
15 Table IV also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a large 
component of the former.  
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Figure 9. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Estonia 
Source: JRC, provisional data provided by Statistics Estonia (www.stat.ee), 2020. 
 
4.2.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above, which mirrors the 
scenario analysis done for the previous countries. Specifically, we assume that the 
number of start-ups, the survival rate, and the growth potential all fall from the sample 
averages to the sample minima (which were reached in the years following the financial 
crisis of 2008), see Table V.16 Moreover, we assume that this decline lasts for one year 
only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins are assumed to be back at their sample 
averages. The scenario is the one of a strong but short-lived crisis expecting that once 
the COVID-19 crisis is tackled, the economic activity of start-ups and young firms will 
resume. 
Table V. Scenario assumptions - Estonia 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -40% -40% -40% -40% 
Growth potential -10% -20% -20% -8% 
Survival rate -4% -5% -5% -3% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
                                   
16 Note that in Table V Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to their sample minima which 
happens to be the same for the three margins in the industry and manufacturing sector, while lower in 
magnitude for the service sector. However, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have impacted particularly 
strongly the service sector imposing strict lockdown measures to sectors such as transport, tourism, and 
hospitality. Alternative scenarios that take into account this asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as 
sectoral data become available.  
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Figure 10 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by just 
1.5% and for 2021 by 1.6%. The recovery is very slow: by 2030, aggregate employment 
is still more than 0.4% below the level it would have attained without the disruption of 
start-up activity. The employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 59,000. Accounting for 
equilibrium adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 29%, leaving a cumulative 
employment loss of about 42,000.  
The decline in the number of start-ups accounts for about two-thirds of the effect due 
also to the high shock applied to this margin. The survival rate accounts for about 23% 
and the growth potential for roughly 14%. These findings provide an important input for 
the policy discussion. The three different margins can be influenced by targeted policies. 
Potential employment benefits of policies targeted towards incentivizing entry of new 
enterprises and to support their survival suggest to be highest. However, the cost of 
different policy options must be considered. 
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table IV shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are more 
dynamic: This sector has much higher start-up and exit rate, and a much higher 
employment share of start-ups and other young firms (Table IV).  
 
 
Figure 10. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Estonia 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Estonia, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of the one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their 
time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate 
employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Figure 11 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. The service sector 
shows a much larger employment loss, even though the decline in the three margins 
assumed is actually somewhat smaller than in manufacturing and industry, especially in 
the growth potential and in the survival rate. This result is driven by the fact that the 
service sector has a high business dynamism and therefore reliant on start-ups and 
young firms to provide employment. Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young 
firms affects the service sector relatively strongly causing a loss of aggregate 
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employment of more than 37,000 jobs (Table VI). The decline in the number of start-ups 
accounts for more than two third of the employment loss (this is also due to the high 
magnitude of the shock applied to this margin), while the decline in the survival rate for 
almost 20%. In the industry and manufacturing sector, the decline in the number of 
start-ups account for about half of the aggregate effect, while the growth potential and 
the survival rate account for about 25%. This is indicative that policy targeted to 
incentivize firm entry and reduce exit could have a significant effect in mitigating the 
impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on aggregate employment, especially in 
the service sector.  
 
  
Figure 11. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - Estonia 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Estonia, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Table VI. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins - Estonia 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 59 k 47 k 10 k 37 k 
# Start-ups 63% 50% 50% 68% 
Growth potential 14% 25% 25% 14% 
Survival rate 23% 25% 25% 18% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Estonia, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
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The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021, which could be stimulated by policies supporting 
entrants and the creation of new business ideas that could lead to radical innovations. 
The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-ups is simulated in 
Figure 12 where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-ups is increased in 
2021 to a level corresponding to the 2020 drop level registered in the time series. After 
an initial sharp decline in aggregate employment, the increased number of start-ups 
entering in 2021 causes a sharp improvement of the employment trend and a lower 
cumulative job loss totalling to about 22,000. Moreover, already in 2021 the aggregate 
employment loss is reduced to only 0.7% and 0.2% by 2025. Tre pre COVID-19 level of 
employment is reached by 2030.  
 
 
Figure 12. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Estonia 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Estonia, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place 
in 2021, to be equal to the sample maxima and last one year.  Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three 
margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on 
aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
4.3 EU start-up calculator: Finland 
4.3.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to negatively affect young firms, leading to a decline 
in the start-up rate, a higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU start-up calculator, these developments are likely to create 
aggregate employment losses, of up to -3% of aggregate employment in 2020. 
The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 could be up to 
230,000. 
• Effects are somewhat persistent: full recovery may take about a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year.  
• About half of the aggregate employment loss is accounted for by the reduction of 
the survival rate and about 20% by the reduction in the number of start-ups. A 
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policy mix targeted to reduce exit of young firms, incentivise entry and scale-ups 
would seem to be the most effective. The outlook is significantly improved if in 
2021 there is a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the economy. i.e. 
the cumulative aggregate employment loss is reduced to 165,000. 
• The Finnish service sector may be affected more strongly than the industry and 
manufacturing sectors, as young firms are important job creators in this sector. 
This also in the case of symmetric shocks across sectors. 
4.3.2 Business dynamism in Finland 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Finnish firms, see Table VII. The statistics show that the Finnish economy 
has a higher firms’ entry and exit compared to the average EU one, especially in the 
service sector which seems to be characterized by a large share of young firms. Over the 
sample about 12% of firms exit within a given year, whereas the start-up rate is above 
11%. These values are above the EU average of 9.2% and 8% for entry and exit rate, 
respectively. Also the employment share of Finnish start-ups and young firms is 
somewhat higher than the EU average. Start-ups (firms of age zero) account for more 
than 2% of aggregate employment whereas firms up to age 5 together account for 
almost 20% while EU average is 12%.17 This indicates that in Finland the depositaries of 
employment growth are young firms. 
Similarly to other European countries, also the Finnish economy has been affected by the 
COVID crisis. Provisional data provided by Statistics Finland show an increasing 
contraction in the number of new businesses created since the beginning of the COVID-
19 pandemic with respect to the same period in 2019. In particular, 10.9% less 
businesses were created in April and 5.7% less in May, in each case compared to the 
corresponding month of 2019 (see Figure 13). However, in June 2020 the number of 
start-ups shows a considerable bounce-back increasing by 12.6% with respect June 
2019. If this bounce-back persists the Finnish start-up scene may recover relatively 
quickly from the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Acknowledging the 
possibility of a rapid recovery in the number of start-ups during the summer months, we 
are at moment entering the second wave of the pandemic. If it will cause further 
disruption of start-up activity, the repercussions for aggregate employment may be 
important. 
 Table VII. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Finland 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 11.2% 7.8% 7% 11.7% 
survival rate 92% 88% 91.5% 91.5% 87.3% 
share of young firms 36% 38.9% 26.6% 26.2% 40% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5%   2.3% 1.5% 1.4% 2.4% 
employment share of young firms 12% 19.2% 11.8% 11.3% 21% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2012 to 2017. 
                                   
17 Table IV also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a large 
component of the former.  
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Figure 13. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Finalnd 
Source: JRC, data provided by Statistic Finland (www.stat.fi)  
4.3.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above. Specifically, we 
assume that the number of start-ups, and the growth potential fall from the sample 
averages to the sample minima during the period 2012-2017, while the survival rate is 
arbitrarily assumed to drop considerably18, see Table VIII.19 Moreover, we assume that 
this decline lasts for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins are assumed 
to be back at their sample averages. Hence, the scenario is the one of a strong but short-
lived crisis expecting that once the pandemic is under control, the economic activity of 
start-ups and young firms will resume. 
Table VIII. Scenario assumptions - Finland 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -15% -15% -15% -15% 
Growth potential -25% -30% -30% -30% 
Survival rate -10% -10% -10% -10% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
                                   
18 In the case of Finland, Eurostat data for the survival rate start in 2013. The short time series does not allow 
us to have 5 years to construct the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, maximum and 
average value of the survival rate are the same number. 
19 Note that in Table VIII Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to their sample minima which 
happens to be the same across sectors. However, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have impacted particularly 
strongly the service sector imposing strict lockdown measures to sectors such as transport, tourism, and 
hospitality. Alternative scenarios that take into account this asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as 
sectoral data become available.  
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Figure 14 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by about 
3%. The recovery is slow: only by 2030 aggregate employment is at the level it would 
have attained without the disruption of start-up activity. The employment loss, 
cumulated up to 2030 is 230,000. Accounting for equilibrium adjustments, aggregate 
effects are dampened by 29%, leaving a cumulative employment loss of about 164,000. 
The decline in the survival rate accounts for about half of the effects. The number of 
start-ups accounts for almost 21% and the growth potential for roughly 35% each. These 
findings provide an important input for the policy discussion. The three different margins 
can be influenced by targeted policies. Potential employment benefits of policies targeted 
towards firm survival suggest to be highest. At the same time policies to reduce entry 
barriers and increase young firm growth potential could support a faster recovery. 
However, the cost of different policy options needs to be taken into account.  
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table VII shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are relatively 
dynamic. This sector has much higher start-up and exit rate, and a much higher 
employment share of start-ups and other young firms. 
 
 
Figure 14. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Finland 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Finland, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and growth 
potential equal to their sample minima and of one year duration, for the survival rate it is arbitrarily assumed to 
be of -10%. The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Finland are available from 2012 to 2017. The short 
time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, maximum and 
average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the plot related to the shock to 
the survival rate). Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their time-path does not 
quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate employment taking into 
account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Figure 15 shows the results of the calculator for the three sectors, namely industry, 
manufacturing and service sector. The service sector shows a much larger employment 
loss, even though the decline in the three margins assumed is actually symmetric to the 
one assumed in manufacturing and industry. This result is driven by the fact that the 
service sector has a higher turnover rate and is more reliant on young firms to provide 
employment. Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young firms affects the service 
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sector stronger than the other sectors causing a loss of aggregate employment of more 
than 171,000 jobs (Table IX). In all the three sectors the decline in the survival rate 
accounts for about 45% of the employment loss. This is indicative that policy targeted to 
incentivize reduce firm exit could have a significant effect in mitigating the impact that 
the COVID-19 pandemic will have on aggregate employment.  
 
  
Figure 15. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - Finland 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Finland, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. business economy except 
the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of the 
business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of firms and the growth 
potential equal to their sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration, for the survival rate 
it is arbitrarily assumed to be of -10%. The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Finland are available 
from 2012 to 2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, 
the minimum, maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the 
plot related to the shock to the survival rate). Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and 
their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not take into account 
general equilibrium effects.  
 
Table IX. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins - Finland 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 230 k 36 k 32 k 171 k 
# Start-ups 21% 20% 20% 20% 
Growth potential 35% 40% 40% 40% 
Survival rate 48% 45% 45% 45% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Finland, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
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The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021 and it should be supported by policies promoting and 
facilitating firm entry. The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-
ups is simulated in Figure 16 where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-
ups is increased in 2021. After an initial sharp decline in aggregate employment, the 
increased number of start-ups entering in 2021 causes a speedy recovery of aggregate 
employment and a lower cumulative job loss totalling to about 165,000. Thanks to this 
enhanced firm entry aggregate employment reaches its pre COVID-19 level by 2026.    
 
 
Figure 16. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Finland 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Finland, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of firms and growth 
potential are equal to their sample minima and of one year duration, for the survival rate it is arbitrarily 
assumed to be of -10%. The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Denmark are available from 2012 to 
2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, 
maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the plot related to 
the shock to the survival rate). The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place in 2021, 
to be equal in magnitude to the negative shock experienced in 2020. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the 
impact on aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
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4.4 EU start-up calculator: France 
4.4.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU start-up calculator, these developments are likely to create 
substantial aggregate employment losses, of up to -1% of aggregate employment 
in 2020. The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 could be up to 
798,000. 
• Effects are somewhat persistent: full recovery may take about a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year.  
• The decline in the growth potential accounts for about more than two-thirds and 
the number of start-ups account for about 30% of the aggregate employment 
loss. Policies targeted to support firm scalability and incentivise entry would seem 
to be the most effective in France. The outlook is significantly improved if in 2021 
there is a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the economy, i.e. the 
cumulative aggregate employment loss is reduced to 434,000 jobs and by 2027 
the employment would reach the level that it would have attained without the 
COVID-19 crisis. 
• The French service sector may be affected stronger than the industry and 
manufacturing sectors, as young firms are important job creators in this sector. 
This also in the case of symmetric or less severe shocks to the service sector.  
4.4.2 Business dynamism in France 
As before, we consider a number of statistics on the dynamism of French firms, see Table 
X. The statistics show that in terms of firms’ entry and exit the French economy is 
somewhat more dynamic than the EU average. Over the sample about 11% of firms exit 
within a given year, whereas the start-up rate reaches almost 12%. Start-ups (firms of 
age zero) account for 3.4% of aggregate employment whereas firms up to age 5 
together account for about 13.6%.20 Additionally, young firms represent 38% of the 
population of active firms in line with the EU average of about 36%.  
Similarly, to other European countries, also the business dynamism of the French 
economy has been affected by the crisis. The contraction in the creation of new 
companies appears evident starting from March 2020. Figure 17 shows how the number 
of new companies created starts to decline in March by 23.4%, to then drop in April by 
48.7% and in May by 17.6%, in each case compared to the corresponding month of 
2019. Hence, France has suffered from a significant disruption of start-up activity during 
the first peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fortunately, as the lockdown measures have 
been progressively lifted in May, the summer months have been characterized by a 
bounce-back in the number of new enterprises registered. However, in France the 
pandemic seems to dramatically accelerate again. If this will once more slow-down start-
up activity the repercussion for aggregate employment may be persistent and important.  
 
 
 
 
                                   
20 Table X also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a large 
component of the former.  
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 Table X. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - France 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 11.6% 7.6% 7.5% 11.7% 
survival rate 92% 88.5% 91.2% 91.1% 88.8% 
share of young firms 36% 38% 28.5% 28.2% 39.3% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 3.4% 2% 1.9% 3.5% 
employment share of young firms 12% 13.6% 9.6% 8.7% 13.3% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2008 to 2017. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - France 
Source: JRC, data available from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee, 
https://www.insee.fr). The series is seasonally and working day adjusted, 2020. 
 
4.4.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above. Specifically, we 
assume that the number of start-ups, the growth potential and the survival rate of young 
firms all fall from the sample averages to the sample minima (which were reached in the 
years following the financial crisis of 2008), see Table XI.21 Moreover, we assume that 
                                   
21 Note that in Table XI the shocks to the Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to relatively 
similar values. However, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have impacted particularly strongly the service 
sector imposing strict lockdown measures to sectors such as transport, tourism, and hospitality. Alternative 
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this decline lasts for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins are assumed 
to be back at their sample averages. As for the previous countries, our benchmark 
scenario assumes a one-off and short-lived negative effect of the Corona-crisis on start-
up activities expecting that once the pandemic is under control, the economic activity of 
start-ups and young firms will resume. 
Table XI. Scenario assumptions - France 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -8% -8% -8% -8% 
Growth potential -18% -30% -25% -18% 
Survival rate -0.5% -0.5% -1% -1% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
Figure 18 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator.22 For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by about 
1%. The recovery is slow, it may take up to a decade to recover the level of aggregate 
employment that could have been attained without the disruption of start-up activity. 
The employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 798,000. Accounting for equilibrium 
adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 29%, leaving a cumulative employment 
loss of about 570,000.  
The decline in the growth potential of start-ups account for 67% of the negative 
employment effect, while the decline in the number of start-ups for about 30%. Instead, 
the survival rate has only a marginal impact: the low magnitude of the shock to this 
margin reveals that exit rate does not fluctuate much in France. As a consequence, it has 
only a minor impact on aggregate employment. These findings provide an important 
input for the policy discussion. The different margins can be influenced by targeted 
policies. Potential employment benefits of policies targeted towards scaling-up of young 
firms, entry of high-innovative start-ups, and ease entry suggest to be highest. At the 
same time policies to reduce entry barriers could support a faster recovery (see also 
Figure 20 which simulates a bounce-back scenario). However, the cost of different policy 
options needs to be taken into account. 
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table X shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are more 
dynamic. This sector has a much higher start-up rate, and a much higher employment 
share of start-ups and other young firms. 
 
                                                                                                          
scenarios that take into account this asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as sectoral data become 
available.  
22 Note that the shock on the survival rate amount to 0.5% is equivalent to set the survival rate to its sample 
minimum during the period 2008-2017. Hence, firm exit seems to be somewhat constant in France and not 
so sensitive to crisis.  
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Figure 18. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - France 
Source: EU start-up calculator, France, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their 
time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate 
employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
 
Figure 19 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. Upon impact, all 
three sectors react somewhat strong to the shock, with the industry and manufacturing 
sectors recovering faster than the service sector. The service sector shows a much larger 
employment loss, even though the decline in the three margins assumed is actually 
somewhat less severe than in the industry and manufacturing sector. This result is driven 
by the fact that the service sector is more dynamic and therefore reliant on young firms 
to provide employment. Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young firms affects 
the service sector relatively strongly causing a loss of aggregate employment of more 
than 623,000 jobs (Table XII). The decline in the growth potential of start-ups seems to 
be the most important margin that account for up to 80% of the employment loss in the 
industry sector. The number of start-ups accounts for about 20-28% across the 
industries. This is indicative that policy targeted to incentivize firm entry and scalability 
could have a significant effect in mitigating the impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will 
have on aggregate employment in France.  
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Figure 19. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - France 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, France, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects.  
Table XII. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins - France 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 798 k 174 k 132 k 623 k 
# Start-ups 30% 20% 23% 28% 
Growth potential 67% 80% 75% 64% 
Survival rate 6% 4% 5% 11% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, France, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021 especially if stimulated by policies targeted to support 
the creation of new firms and innovative ideas. The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back 
in the number of start-ups is simulated in Figure 20 where, after the initial negative 
shock, the number of start-ups is increased in 2021 to the maximum level registered in 
the time series. After an initial sharp decline in aggregate employment, the increased 
number of start-ups entering in 2021 causes a speedy recovery of aggregate 
employment and a lower cumulative job loss during the period 2020-2030 totalling to 
about 434,000. Thanks to this enhanced firm entry aggregate employment reaches its 
pre COVID-19 trend by 2027.    
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Figure 20. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
France 
Source: EU start-up calculator, France, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place 
in 2021, to be equal to the sample maximum and last one year.  Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the 
impact on aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
4.5 EU start-up calculator: Latvia 
4.5.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate, a higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU Start-up Calculator, these developments are likely to create 
large aggregate employment losses, of up to almost -4.5% in 2020 and 2021 of 
aggregate employment. The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-
2030 could be up to 219,000. 
• Effects are highly persistent: full recovery may take more than a decade; by 
2030, aggregate employment is still more than 1% below the level it would have 
attained without the disruption of start-up activity. 
• The decline in the number of start-ups accounts for about 20% of the employment 
loss, the decline in the survival rate for almost 45% and the decline of the growth 
potential of start-ups for about 35%. A holistic approach to policies targeted to 
reduce exit of young firms and incentivise entry and productivity of new firms 
would seem to be the most effective in Latvia. The outlook is significantly 
improved if in 2021 there is a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the 
economy, i.e. the cumulative aggregate employment loss is reduced to 176,000. 
• The Latvian service sector may be affected particularly strongly, as young firms 
are particularly important job creators in this sector. 
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4.5.2 Business dynamism in Latvia 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Latvian firms, see Table XIII. The statistics show that, when it comes to 
firms’ entry and exit, the Latvian economy is relatively dynamic when compared with the 
EU average, and relies heavily on start-ups for job creation. Over the sample, more than 
10% of firms exit within a given year, whereas the start-up rate is about 12.8%. Start-
ups (firms of age zero) account for about 3.5% of aggregate employment. Firms up to 
age 5 together account for more than 20% of aggregate employment (while the EU 
average settles at 12%).  
 Table XIII. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Latvia 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 12.8% 10.2% 10.2% 12.9% 
survival rate 92% 89.7% 91.7% 91.4% 89.8% 
share of young firms 36% 47.2% 38.6% 39% 47.5% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 3.5% 1.9% 2.1% 3.9% 
employment share of young firms 12% 20.7% 12.4% 13.5% 22.5% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2008 to 2017. 
 
The importance of start-ups and young firms is particularly evident in the service sector 
where young firms account for about half of the total number of active firms and for 
more than 22% of total employment (Table XIII).23 Hence, it has to be expected that this 
sector will be most strongly hit by a disruption of start-up activities also when shocks 
across sectors are symmetric. 
Even before the spread of COVID-19, the creation of new companies in Latvia showed a 
contraction with respect the same period in 2019.  This negative trend persists 
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic with a monthly contraction of new start-up 
registered which varies between 1.8% to 1.3% compared to the corresponding months of 
2019 (Figure 21). These provisional statistics show an important and persistent 
disruption of start-up activity that seems to characterize the year 2020. This can have 
important repercussions for aggregate employment, especially if the number of start-ups 
does not recover.   
 
                                   
23 Table XIII also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a 
large component of the former.  
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Figure 21. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Latvia 
Source: provisional data from the Latvian Enterprise Register (https://www.ur.gov.lv), 2020. 
 
4.5.3 Scenario analysis 
As for the previous countries analysed, we consider a deterioration of the three margins 
described above. Specifically, we assume that the number of start-ups, the survival rate, 
and the growth potential all fall from the sample averages to the sample minima (which 
were reached in the years following the financial crisis of 2008), see Table XIV.24 
Moreover, we assume that this decline lasts for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the 
three margins are assumed to be back at their sample averages. The scenario is the one 
of a strong but short-lived crisis expecting that once the COVID-19 pandemic will be 
tackled, the economic activity of start-ups and young firms will resume. 
Table XIV. Scenario assumptions - Latvia 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -20% -20% -20% -30% 
Growth potential -35% -40% -40% -35% 
Survival rate -10% -10% -10% -10% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
                                   
24 Note that in Table XIV Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to their sample minima which 
happens to be lower for the service sector only in the number of start-ups. However, the COVID-19 crisis 
seems to have impacted particularly strongly the service sector imposing strict lockdown measures to 
sectors such as transport, tourism, and hospitality. Alternative scenarios that take into account this 
asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as sectoral data become available.  
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Figure 22. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Latvia 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Latvia, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their 
time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate 
employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Figure 22 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by 
almost 4.5%. The negative trend persists during 2021. The recovery is very slow: by 
2030, aggregate employment is still more than 1% below the level it would have attained 
without the disruption of start-up activity. The employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 
219,000. Accounting for equilibrium adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 
29%, leaving a cumulative employment loss of about 156,000. The decline in the survival 
rate accounts for about 45% of the effects. The number of start-ups accounts for about 
20% and the growth potential for roughly 35% each. These findings provide an important 
input for the policy discussion pointing to the need of a holistic policy approach. The 
three different margins can be influenced by a mix of targeted policies. While, potential 
employment benefits of policies targeted towards firm survival suggest to be highest, 
promoting firm entry and the growth potential of entrants plays an essential role. 
However, the cost of different policy options needs to be taken into account.  
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table XIII shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are more 
dynamic. This sector has much higher start-up rate, and a much higher employment 
share of start-ups and other young firms. 
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Figure 23. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) -Latvia 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Latvia, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Table XV. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins Latvia 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 219 k 35 k 31 k 167 k 
# Start-ups 20% 19% 19% 27% 
Growth potential 35% 37% 38% 32% 
Survival rate 45% 44% 43% 41% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Latvia, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
Figure 23 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. The service sector 
shows a much larger reaction to the negative shock to the three margin. Employment 
declines of 5% in 2020 and the cumulative employment loss in the period 2020-2030 is 
of more than 160,000 jobs. This result is partly due to a larger shock to the number of 
start-ups compared to the decline assumed in manufacturing and industry. Most 
importantly, it is driven by the fact that the service sector is more dynamic (in terms of 
entry and exit rates) and therefore reliant on young firms to provide employment. Hence, 
a disruption to start-ups and other young firms affects the service sector relatively 
strongly. Finally, in all the three sectors the decline in the survival rate accounts for more 
than 40% of the effect. The decline of the number of start-ups seems to be stronger in 
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the service sector accounting for almost 30% of the effect while in industry and 
manufacturing accounts is fewer than 20%. Finally, the decline in the growth potential 
accounts for more than 30% in each sector. These considerations summarized in Table 
XV can be of relevance for the policy discussion.   
The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of delayed 
entry, pushing up the start-up rate in 2021. Following the discussion above, policies 
aimed at facilitating the entry of new firms in the market can be quite effective. The 
optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-ups is simulated in Figure 24 
where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-ups is increased in 2021 
equivalent to the drop experienced in 2020. After an initial sharp decline in aggregate 
employment, the increased number of start-ups entering in 2021 causes a significant 
improvement of the employment trend and a lower cumulative job loss totalling to about 
176,000. Despite the better outlook the recovery is still sluggish and aggregate 
employment still does not reach its pre COVID-19 level by 2030.    
 
 
Figure 24. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Latvia 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Latvia, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place 
in 2021, to be equal to the sample maxima and last one year.  Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three 
margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on 
aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
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4.6 EU start-up calculator: Lithuania 
4.6.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate, higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU start-up calculator, these developments are likely to create 
substantial aggregate employment losses, of up to -2.5% of aggregate 
employment in 2020. The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 
could be up to 134,000. 
• Effects are very persistent: full recovery may take more than a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year.  
• More than 40% of the aggregate employment loss is accounted for by the 
reduction in the number of start-ups and the survival rate, each. Policies targeted 
to support young firm survival and promote new firms’ entry would seem to be 
the most effective. The outlook is improved if in 2021 there is a rapid increase in 
the number of firms entering the economy. i.e. the cumulative aggregate 
employment loss is reduced to 74,000. 
• The Lithuanian service sector may be affected particularly strongly, as young 
firms are particularly important job creators in this sector. In this sector most of 
the employment loss is due to the decline in the number of start-ups and in the 
survival rate. Instead, in the manufacturing and service sectors also the decline in 
the growth potential plays an important role.   
4.6.2 Business dynamism in Lithuania 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Lithuanian firms, see Table XVI.  
	 Table XVI. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Lithuania 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 10.3% 8.9% 7.4% 10.5% 
survival rate 92% 91.8% 92.6% 93.3% 91.9% 
share of young firms 36% 46.4% 38.3% 34.9% 47% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 2.9% 2% 1.5% 3.1% 
employment share of young firms 12% 18% 11.6% 11% 21.5% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2008 to 2017. 
 
The statistics show that, when it comes to entry and exit of firms, the Lithuanian 
economy has a higher start-up rate than the EU average. An important share of job 
creation is attributed to start-ups and young firms, which is higher than the EU average. 
Over the sample, about 8% of firms exit within a given year, whereas the start-up rate is 
about 10%. Start-ups (firms of age zero) account for about 3% of aggregate 
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employment whereas firms up to age 5 together account for more than 18%.25  When 
looking at the sectoral disaggregation, the service sector contributes to most of the 
business dynamic of the overall economy with a start-up rate of above 10% and an 
employment share of start-ups of more than 20%. 
Moreover, provisional data provided by Statics Lithuania show an increasing contraction 
in the number of new businesses created since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic 
with respect to the same period in 2019. In particular, 20.9% less businesses were 
created in March, 41.2% less in April, and 7.5% less in May, in each case compared to 
the corresponding month of 2019 (see Figure 25). Interestingly, in June 2016 the 
number of start-ups shows a bounce-back increasing by 57.5% with respect June 2019, 
while July and August show only a slight contraction with respect to last year values. If 
this trend persists the Lithuanian start-up scene may recover relatively quickly from the 
negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Acknowledging the possibility of a rapid 
recovery in the number of start-ups during the second half of the year, these statistics 
show an important disruption of start-up activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
can have important repercussions for aggregate employment, especially if a second wave 
of the pandemic may result in interventions that may restrict again economic activities.  
 
Figure 25. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Lithuania 
Source: JRC, provisional data on the total of new companies registered are provided by Statistics Lithuania 
(www.stat.gov.lt) 
 
4.6.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above. Specifically, we 
assume that the number of start-ups, the survival rate and the growth potential fall from 
the sample averages to the sample minima (which were reached in the years following 
the financial crisis of 2008), see Table XVII.26 Moreover, we assume that this decline 
lasts for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins are assumed to be back 
                                   
25 Table XVI also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a large 
component of the former.  
26 Note that in Table XVII Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to their sample minima which 
happens to be similar for the number of start-ups. Moreover, the shock to the service sector is 
characterized by a higher decline of the survival rate but a considerably lower decline in the growth 
potential of start-ups. However, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have impacted particularly strongly the 
service sector imposing strict lockdown and restrictive measures to sectors such as transport, tourism, and 
hospitality. Alternative scenarios that take into account this asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as 
sectoral data become available.  
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at their sample averages. The scenario is the one of a strong but short-lived crisis 
expecting that once the pandemic is under control, the economic activity of start-ups and 
young firms will resume. This expectation seems to be consistent with the recent 
economic trend.  
Table XVII. Scenario assumptions - Lithuania 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -25% -25% -22% -25% 
Growth potential -10% -30% -17% -3% 
Survival rate -7% -4% -5% -7% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
 
Figure 26. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Lithuania 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Lithuania, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their 
time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate 
employment taking into account general equilibrium effects. 
 
Figure 26 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by over 
2.5%. The recovery is slow: by 2026, aggregate employment is still more than 0.8% 
below the level it would have attained without the disruption of start-up activity. The 
employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 134,000. Accounting for equilibrium 
adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 29%, leaving a cumulative employment 
loss of about 95,000 (blue line in Figure 26). The decline in the number of start-ups and 
in the survival rate account for about 40% each, while the growth potential for roughly 
17%. These findings provide an important input for the policy discussion. The three 
 
43 
different margins can be influenced by targeted policies. Potential employment benefits 
of policies targeted towards firm survival and to promote firm entry suggest to be 
highest. However, the cost of different policy options needs to be taken into account.  
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table XVI shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are more 
dynamic. This sector has higher start-up and exit rate, and a much higher employment 
share of start-ups and other young firms.  
Figure 27 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. The service sector 
shows a larger employment loss, even though the decline in the growth potential of 
start-ups is considerably smaller (Table XVII). This result is driven by the fact that the 
service sector is more dynamic in terms of entry and exit and therefore reliant on young 
firms to provide employment. 
 
  
Figure 27. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - Lithuania 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Lithuania, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects. 
 
Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young firms affects the service sector 
relatively strongly causing a loss of aggregate employment of more than 84,000 jobs 
(Table XVIII). The decline in the number of start-ups explains about half of the 
employment effect, while the survival rate about 45%, leaving only a marginal role 
played by the growth potential. Instead, in the industry and manufacturing sector the 
decline of the growth potential explains more than 30% of the overall employment loss 
as a consequence of a larger magnitude of the shock affecting this margin in these 
sectors. These considerations are indicative that policy targeted to support firms to tackle 
survival challenges and support entry could have a significant effect in mitigating the 
impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on aggregate employment. 
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Table XVIII. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins - Lithuania 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 134 k 27 k 17 k 84 k 
# Start-ups 43% 36% 39% 49% 
Growth potential 17% 44% 30% 6% 
Survival rate 40% 20% 31% 45% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Lithuania, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021 especially if supported by specific policies targeted to 
start-ups that could reduce entry barriers, promote innovation and relax financial 
constraints. The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-ups is 
simulated in Figure 28 where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-ups is 
increased in 2021 to the maximum level registered in the time series. After an initial 
sharp decline in aggregate employment, the increased number of start-ups entering in 
2021 causes an improvement of the employment trend and a lower cumulative job loss 
totalling to about 74,000. Thanks to the better outlook aggregate employment reaches 
its pre COVID-19 level by 2026. This is due to the fact that the number of start-ups 
account for a large share of the impact on aggregate employment, i.e. about 43%, of the 
total effect on employment (see Table XVIII). 
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Figure 28. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Lithuania 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Lithuania, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place 
in 2021, to be equal to the sample maxima and last one year.  Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three 
margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on 
aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
 
4.7 EU start-up calculator: Portugal 
4.7.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate, a higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups. 
• According to the EU start-up calculator, these developments are likely to create 
substantial aggregate employment losses, of up to -0.9% of aggregate 
employment in 2020. The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 
could be up to 131,000. 
• Effects are very persistent: full recovery may take more than a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year. By 2026, aggregate 
employment is still more than 0.3% below the level it would have attained without 
the disruption of start-up activity 
• The decline in the number of start-ups accounts for about 60% of the employment 
loss, while the decline in the growth potential of start-ups and in the survival rate 
of young firms for about 20% each. Policies targeted to incentivise entry would 
seem to be the most effective in Portugal. The outlook is significantly improved if 
in 2021 there is a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the economy, i.e. 
the cumulative aggregate employment loss is reduced to 79,000.  
• The Portuguese service sector may be affected particularly strongly, as young 
firms are particularly important job creators in this sector. 
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4.7.2 Business dynamism in Portugal 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Portuguese firms, see Table XIX. The statistics show that, when it comes to 
firm entry and exit, the Portuguese economy is in line with the EU 27 average, relying 
importantly on start-ups for job creation. Over the sample, more than 11% of firms exit 
within a given year, whereas the start-up rate is above 9%. Start-ups (firms of age zero) 
account for about 3% of aggregate employment whereas firms up to age 5 together 
account for more than 16% implying a higher contribution from young firm as job 
creators in Portugal relative to the EU average of 12%. 27 
	 Table XIX. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Portugal 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 9.4% 6.6% 6.6% 10% 
survival rate 92% 89.9% 92.1% 92.1% 89.9% 
share of young firms 36% 39.2% 30.2% 30% 40.7% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 2.9% 1.6% 1.7% 3.3% 
employment share of young firms 12% 16.7% 11.6% 11.7% 18.1% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2008 to 2017. 
 
Moreover, recent data from the Portuguese National Statistical Institute shows an 
increasing contraction in the number of new businesses created since the beginning of 
the year with respect to the same period in 2019. While the negative trend is present 
since the beginning of the year, it has sharply deteriorated since the start of the COVID-
19 pandemic and the ensuing hibernation of most of the economic activities. In 
particular, 51.4% less businesses were created in March, (when the COVID-19 pandemic 
started), 70.8% less in April (when strict lockdown measures have been implemented), 
41.2% less in May and 17% less in June and July, in each case compared to the 
corresponding month of 2019 (see Figure 29). These statistics show an important and 
persistent disruption of start-up activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which seems to 
continue also over the summer months. This can have important repercussions for 
aggregate employment, especially if the number of start-ups does not recover quickly as 
Figure 29 seems to suggest.  
 
                                   
27 Table XIX also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a large 
component of the former.  
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Figure 29.	Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Portugal 
Source: JRC, data from the Portuguese National Statistical Institute (http://www.ine.pt), 2020. 
 
4.7.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above. Specifically, we 
assume that the number of start-ups, the survival rate, and the growth potential all fall 
from the sample averages to the sample minima (which were reached in the years 
following the financial crisis of 2008), see Table XX.28 Moreover, we assume that this 
decline lasts for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins are assumed to be 
back at their sample averages. The scenario is the one of a strong but short-lived crisis 
expecting that once the containment measures are lifted, the economic activity of start-
ups and young firms will resume. 
Table XX. Scenario assumptions - Portugal 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -15% -8% -8% -15% 
Growth potential -6% -7% -7% -6% 
Survival rate -1,5% -2% -2% -1.5% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat, i.e.  all business economy except 
the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of the 
business economy except activities of holding companies.  
 
Figure 30 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by over 
0.9%, decline that persist also in 2021. The recovery is very slow: by 2026, aggregate 
                                   
28 Note that in Table XX Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sector are set to their sample minima. However, 
the COVID-19 crisis seems to have impacted particularly strongly the service sector imposing strict 
lockdown measures to sectors such as transport, tourism, and hospitality. Alternative scenarios that take 
into account this asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as sectoral data become available.  
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employment is still more than 0.3% below the level it would have attained without the 
disruption of start-up activity. The employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 131,000. 
Accounting for equilibrium adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 29%, 
leaving a cumulative employment loss of about 93,000. The decline in the number of 
start-ups accounts for about 60%. The survival rate and the growth potential for roughly 
20% each. These findings provide an important input for the policy discussion. The three 
different margins can be influenced by targeted policies. Potential employment benefits 
of policies targeted towards ease firm entry suggest to be highest. However, the cost of 
different policy options needs to be taken into account.  
 
 
Figure 30. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Portugal 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Portugal, 2020.  
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their 
time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate 
employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table XIX shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are relatively 
more dynamic. This sector has much higher start-up and exit rate, and a much higher 
employment share of start-ups and other young firms.   
Figure 31 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. The service sector 
shows a much larger employment loss, partially due to a larger shock assumed in the 
number of start-ups and despite the decline in the survival rate and growth potential 
assumed is actually somewhat smaller than in manufacturing and industry. This result is 
driven by the fact that the service sector is relatively dynamic and therefore reliant on 
young firms to provide employment. Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young 
firms affects the service sector relatively strongly causing a loss of aggregate 
employment of more than 87,000 jobs (Table XXI). The decline in the number of start-
ups account for about 60% of the employment loss. In the industry ad manufacturing 
sectors, the decline of the three margins account for more than 20% each. This is 
indicative that different policy mixes should be targeted at different sectors. Policies 
aimed at easing firm entry seems particular effective in the service sector, while a policy 
targeted to incentivize firm entry, scalability and reduce exit in the industry and 
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manufacturing sector could have a significant effect in mitigating the impact that the 
COVID-19 pandemic will have on aggregate employment.  
 
Figure 31. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - Portugal 
 Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Spain, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat - i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Table XXI. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the three margins - 
Portugal 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 131 k 20 k 18 k 87 k 
# Start-ups 60% 37% 38% 60% 
Growth potential 24% 32% 33% 24% 
Survival rate 19% 32% 31% 18% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Portugal, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021, especially when targeted policies to promote firm entry 
are put in place. The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-ups is 
simulated in Figure 32 where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-ups is 
increased in 2021 to the maximum level registered in the time series. After an initial 
sharp decline in aggregate employment, the increased number of start-ups entering in 
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2021 causes an improvement of the employment trend and a lower cumulative job loss 
totalling to about 79,000. Thanks to the better outlook aggregate employment reaches 
its pre COVID-19 level by 2026.    
 
 
Figure 32. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Portugal 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Portugal, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the three margins equal to their 
sample minima and of one year duration. The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place 
in 2021, to be equal to the sample maximum and last one year.  Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the 
impact on aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
.  
4.8 EU start-up calculator: Sweden 
4.8.1 Summary 
• The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect young firms, leading to a decline in 
the start-up rate, higher exit of young firms, and lower growth of start-ups 
despite Sweden has not imposed strict lockdown measures. 
• According to the EU start-up calculator, these developments are likely to create 
substantial aggregate employment losses, of up to -2% of aggregate employment 
in 2020. The cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 could be up to 
267,000. 
• Effects are very persistent: full recovery may take more than a decade, even if 
start-up activity recovers to its pre-crisis level in one year.  
• About two-thirds of the aggregate employment loss is accounted for by the 
reduction of the survival rate and about 25% by the reduction in the number of 
start-ups. Policies targeted to support young firm survival and promote new firms’ 
entry suggest to be the most effective. The outlook is improved if in 2021 there is 
a rapid increase in the number of firms entering the economy. i.e. the cumulative 
aggregate employment loss is reduced to 200,000. 
• The Swedish service sector may be affected particularly strongly, as young firms 
are particularly important job creators in this sector. Across the three sectors, the 
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survival rate accounts for the larger share of employment loss: about 65% in the 
service sector and more than 80% in the industry and manufacturing sectors.  
4.8.2 Business dynamism in Sweden 
Before presenting the scenario analysis, we consider a number of statistics on the 
dynamism of Swedish firms, see Table XXII.  
	 Table XXII. Descriptive statistics on the economy and sector dynamics of young firms - Sweden 
 
EU 27 
All All Industry Manufacturing Services 
start-up rate 9.2% 10.2% 5.7% 5.6% 10.8% 
survival rate 92% 91.4% 93.5% 93.6% 90.7% 
share of young firms 36% 31.2% 19.3% 18.9% 33% 
employment share of start-ups 2.5% 2% 0.5% 0.5% 2.3% 
employment share of young firms 12% 7.1% 1.8% 1.8% 8.1% 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. The time series is from 2012 to 2017. 
 
The statistics show that, when it comes to entry and exit of firms, the Swedish economy 
has a slightly higher start-up rate and exit rate than the EU average.29 A seemingly 
important share of job creation is attributed to start-ups and young firms, although lower 
than the EU average. Over the sample, about 9% of firms exit within a given year, 
whereas the start-up rate is about 10%. Start-ups (firms of age zero) account for about 
2% of aggregate employment whereas firms up to age 5 together account for more than 
7%.30  When looking at the sectoral disaggregation, the service sector contributes to 
most of the business dynamism of the overall economy with a start-up rate reaching 
almost 11% and an employment share of young firms of more than 8%, while industry 
and manufacturing have an average start-up rate of 5.6% and an employment share of 
young firms lower than 2%. 
Sweden has not imposed any lockdown measure to limit the spread of the COVID-19 
virus and relied only on behavioural recommendation for its population. This approach 
has affected the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the same 
period in 2019. In particular, Figure 33 shows that the creation of new companies has 
been impacted by the crisis only in April and May showing a small contraction in 2020 
with respect to the same period in 2019. This contraction is more than compensated by a 
sharp increment in the number of new companies registered in June 2020 with respect to 
June 2019. Nevertheless, real time data suggests that the overall economy has been 
slowed down by the pandemic (e.g. drop in the Market Confidence Index, in the number 
of restaurant bookings, in the mobility rate and similar indicators, especially during the 
months of March, April and May – see c19impact.com). 
 
                                   
29 Differently to what commonly observed, the exit rate of Swedish firms seems to increase as firm age 
(Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020). 
30 Table XXII also indicates that industry and manufacturing are very similar to each other as the latter is a 
large component of the former.  
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Figure 33. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in 2020 with respect to the 
same period in 2019 (percentage) - Sweden 
Source: JRC, provisional data on the total of new companies registered are provided by the Swedish 
Registration Offices of Companies (www.bolagsverket.se). The data in the chart consider all types of new 
companies registered monthly during the period January 2019 and September 2020. 
 
4.8.3 Scenario analysis 
We consider a deterioration of the three margins described above consistent with the 
scenarios assumed for the other Nordic countries. Specifically, we assume that the 
number of start-ups and the survival rate fall from the sample averages to the sample 
minima, while the survival rate drops considerably and seemingly to what simulated for 
Denmark and Finland31, see Table XXIII.32 Moreover, we assume that this decline lasts 
for one year only. From 2021 onwards, the three margins are assumed to be back at 
their sample averages. The scenario is the one of a strong but short-lived crisis.  
Table XXIII. Scenario assumptions - Sweden 
 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
# Start-ups -15% -5% -4% -15% 
Growth potential -6% -6% -6% -6% 
Survival rate -10% -10% -10% -10% 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
                                   
31 In the case of Sweden, Eurostat data for the survival rate start in 2013. The short time series does not allow 
us to have 5 years to construct the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, maximum and 
average value of the survival rate are the same number. 
32 Note that in Table XXIII the margins of the Industry, Manufacturing and Serving sectors are set to their 
sample minima, which happens to be the larger in magnitude only for the number of start-ups in the 
service sector. However, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have impacted particularly strongly the service 
sector imposing strict lockdown measures to sectors such as transport, tourism, and hospitality. Alternative 
scenarios that take into account this asymmetry can easily be computed as soon as sectoral data become 
available.  
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Figure 34. Scenario analysis for employment and the three margins of start-up activity - Sweden 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Sweden, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and the 
growth potential equal to their sample minima and of one year duration (for the survival rate it is arbitrarily 
assumed to be of -10%). The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Sweden are available from 2012 to 
2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, 
maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the plot related to 
the shock to the survival rate). Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three margins and their time-path 
does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on aggregate employment 
taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
Figure 34 shows the scenario assumptions on the three margins, as well as the 
implications for aggregate employment produced by the calculator. For 2020, the 
calculator shows that the three margins together reduce aggregate employment by 
almost 2%. The recovery is slow: by 2026, aggregate employment is still more than 
0.5% below the level it would have attained without the disruption of start-up activity. 
The employment loss, cumulated up to 2030 is 267,000. Accounting for equilibrium 
adjustments, aggregate effects are dampened by 29%, leaving a cumulative employment 
loss of about 191,000 (blue line in Figure 34). The decline in the survival rate accounts 
for about 65% of the effect, while the decline in the number of start-ups accounts for 
about 25%. These findings provide an important input for the policy discussion. The 
three different margins can be influenced by targeted policies. Potential employment 
benefits of policies targeted towards firm survival and to promote firm entry suggest to 
be highest. However, the cost of different policy options needs to be taken into account.  
Moreover, we consider how sectors may be affected differently. Table XXII shows that, 
compared to manufacturing and overall industry, firms in the service sector are 
somewhat more dynamic. This sector has higher start-up and exit rate, and a much 
higher employment share of start-ups and other young firms compared to the industry 
and manufacturing sectors.  
Figure 35 shows the results of the calculator for the three industries. The service sector 
shows a larger employment loss. This result is driven by the fact that the service sector 
is more dynamic in terms of entry and exit and young firms account for a larger share of 
employment compare to the industry and manufacturing sectors.  
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Figure 35. Sectors employment (not equilibrium adjusted) - Sweden 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Sweden, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
Note(2): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and the 
growth potential equal to their sample minima in the respective sectors and of one year duration (for the 
survival rate it is arbitrarily assumed to be of -10%). The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Sweden 
are available from 2012 to 2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a 
consequence, the minimum, maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number 
(yellow line in the plot related to the shock to the survival rate). Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the 
three margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The employment path does not 
take into account general equilibrium effects.  
Table XXIV. Share of aggregate employment loss accounted for by the margins - Sweden 
 
All Industry Manufacturing Services 
Cumulative employment loss 267 k 18 k 15 k 200 k 
# Start-ups 25% 9% 7% 25% 
Growth potential 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Survival rate 65% 81% 83% 65% 
Source: JRC, EU start-up calculator, Sweden, 2020. 
Note(1): The sector aggregate reflects the classifications available in Eurostat – i.e. all business economy 
except the activities of holding companies, the industrial sector except construction, and the service sector of 
the business economy except activities of holding companies. 
 
Hence, a disruption to start-ups and other young firms affects the service sector 
relatively strongly causing a loss of aggregate employment of about 200,000 jobs (Table 
XXIV). In all the three sectors the margin with the highest impact on aggregate 
employment is the survival rate. Its decline accounts for more than 80% of the job loss 
in the industry and manufacturing sector and for about 65% in the service sector. The 
decline in the number of start-ups accounts plays an important role in the service sector 
accounting for about 25% of the employment loss. These considerations are indicative 
that policy targeted to support firms to tackle survival challenges across sectors and 
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support entry in the service sector could have a significant effect in mitigating the impact 
that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on aggregate employment. 
 
Figure 36. Bounce-back scenario in the number of firms, results for aggregate employment - 
Sweden 
Source: EU start-up calculator, Sweden, 2020. 
Note(1): The simulation on aggregate employment considers a shock on the number of start-ups and growth 
potential equal to their sample minima and of the duration of one year (for the survival rate it is arbitrarily 
assumed to be of -10%). The Business Demography data of Eurostat for Sweden are available from 2012 to 
2017. The short time series does not allow to compute the 1-5 survival rate. As a consequence, the minimum, 
maximum and average value of the survival rate collapse to the same number (yellow line in the plot related to 
the shock to the survival rate) The bounce-back in the number of start-ups is assumed to take place in 2021, to 
be equal to the sample maximum and of one year duration. Firms older than 15 are unaffected by the three 
margins and their time-path does not quantitatively affect the analysis. The blue line represents the impact on 
aggregate employment taking into account general equilibrium effects.  
 
 
The subdued firm entry in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis may be the result of a pent-
up with more firm entry in 2021 especially if supported by specific policies targeted to 
start-ups that could reduce the entry barriers, promote innovation and relax financial 
constraints. The optimistic outlook for a bounce-back in the number of start-ups is 
simulated in Figure 36 where, after the initial negative shock, the number of start-ups is 
increased in 2021 to the maximum level registered in the time series. After an initial 
sharp decline in aggregate employment, the increased number of start-ups entering in 
2021 causes an improvement of the employment trend and a lower cumulative job loss 
totalling to about 227,000. Thanks to the better outlook aggregate employment reaches 
its pre COVID-19 level faster.  
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5 Conclusions 
The COVID-19 crisis is likely to heavily affect start-ups and young firms and ultimately 
affect aggregate employment. To understand the impact, we developed the EU start-up 
calculator. This is an empirical tool which allows to assess the medium-term impact that 
the COVID-19 pandemic has on aggregate employment via the destruction of start-up 
activities varying three margins: (i) the number of start-ups, (ii) the growth potential and 
(iii) the survival rate. Different scenarios have been analysed for the business economy,
the industry, manufacturing and service sector of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden. This work follows closely the first report on the
“EU start-up calculator which analyses the start-up dynamics for Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain (Benedetti Fasil, Sedlác ̌ek and Sterk (2020)).
A strong but short lived-crisis may result in important and persist job losses in all the 
countries that range between 0.9 (Portugal) to 4.5% (Latvia) in 2020 and adds to a 
cumulative employment loss for the period 2020-2030 that ranges between 59,000 
(Estonia) to 798,000 (France). These losses seem to be particularly high in countries and 
sectors characterized by a high firm turnover and that rely on start-ups and young firms 
for job creation, e.g. Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal, as well as the 
service sector rather than the industry and manufacturing sector. As for the margins 
considered, in most countries the deterioration of the survival rate of young firms seems 
to play an important role in driving employment, seconded by the number of new 
entrants. The exceptions are France, where the decline in the growth potential accounts 
for more than two-thirds of the aggregate employment loss, and Estonia and Portugal 
where the lion share in explaining the employment loss is played by the decline in the 
number of start-ups.  
Notwithstanding the significant economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the medium-term effects on aggregate employment may be significantly mitigated by 
policies aimed at supporting young firms and incentivizing the creation of new ones. This 
represents a positive factor as this group of firms, i.e. start-ups and young firms, is 
easily identifiable by policy makers and hence represents an easy target for policy 
interventions. With this in mind we explored the potential impact that policies may have 
on aggregate employment. In particular, we simulated bounce-back scenarios where the 
number of firms entering the economy rapidly increases in 2021. In every country, the 
outlook is significantly improved, the recovery is faster and the aggregate job loss is 
lower. Hence, policy makers may have amble margin of manoeuvre to alleviate the crisis 
with a mix of policies that while being targeted may also be efficient.  
Along these lines, the European Union has launched a series of guidelines and 
instruments, such as InvestEu, the European Innovation Council and, as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the Recovery Resilience Facility. One of the goals of these 
instruments is to support the creation of a vibrant and more resilient entrepreneurial 
ecosystem with particular attention to promote start-ups and young firms. The 
interventions include access to liquidity and funding to start-ups and young firms in the 
forms of grants, equity or zero-interest loans especially targeted to scale-ups, to 
promising innovators and R&D investments, and to support young enterprises’ needs. 
Also the use of in-kind support, such as training programs, creation of network 
opportunities with peer-entrepreneurs, customers and suppliers to rebuild the value 
chain, and the promotion of knowledge transfer from applied research to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem are considered as priorities. Focus is also put on the creation 
of new opportunities via the promotion of digitalization and of the green transition. 
Finally, there is the indication to reduce and simplify the red-tape costs upon entry and 
the general administrative burden that firms face. If policy makers will be able to design 
and target these instruments to promote start-ups and young firms, then the recovery 
from the COVID-19 disruption will be considerably faster and the outlook much more 
positive. We postpone to further research the assessment on how these interventions 
may affect the three margins that govern the scenario creation of the start-up calculator 
and ultimately the impact that they will have on aggregate employment.  
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Appendix 
Appendix I. Figures 
The introduction avails of a series of figures summarising summary statistics for start-
ups and young firms, their importance for job creation and timely date on the registration 
of new companies in the first two quarters of 2020 with respect to the same period in 
2019. This Appendix proposes the same figures for a larger set of Member States.  
 
Figure A1. Importance of start-ups and young firms for aggregate employment 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020. 
 
Note(1): The time series for the EU27, Denmark and Finland is between 2012 and 2017, for Austria, Belgium, 
Estonia, France, Latvia, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain between 2008 and 2017, for Lithuania from 2009 to 
2017. The Business Demography dataset for Germany and Sweden does not have enough data to compute the 
start-up and young firm contribution to growth. Hence, this is omitted in the Figure. For the other statistics the 
time series is between 2012 and 2017. 
 
 
Figure A2. Importance of start-ups for job creation 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020. 
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Figure A3. Annual change in the number of new companies registered in the first and second 
quarter of 2020 with respect to January to April 2019 (percentage) 
Source: JRC, data from Statistics Belgium (STABEL), the Danish Statistical Institute (DST), Statistics Estonia 
(SE), Statistics Finland (SF), the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee), the Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany providing preliminary data (DESTATIS), the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(KSH), the Italian Association of the Chamber of Commerce (IC), the Enterprise Register of Latvia 
(https://www.ur.gov.lv/en/statistics/), Statistics Lithuania (https://www.stat.gov.lt), the Portuguese National 
Statistical Institute (INE), the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE) and the Swedish Registration Offices 
of Companies (Bolagsverket). 
Note(1): The data, which come from national statistical offices or enterprise registers, are not harmonized 
across countries. As a consequence, Figure 3 does not allow for quantitative cross-country comparisons per se. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to visualize the different impact that COVID-19 has had across countries in terms of 
start-up creation. 
 
 
Figure A4. Y-o-y survival rate of start-ups 
Source: JRC, Eurostat, Business Demography dataset, 2020. 
 
Note(1): The Eurostat database provides the y-o-y survival rates for start-ups after one, two, three, four and 
five years of activities. The plotted percentages are the averages of the period from 2013 to 2017 for the EU 
27, from 2008 to 2017 for Estonia, France, Latvia, from 2008 to 2018 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain and Sweden and from 2009 to 2017 for Denmark.  
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Appendix II. Interpolation, extrapolation and creation of scenarios 
In Eurostat for firms of age a = {0,1,2,3,4,5} in year t ∈	[2008-2017] is directly 
observable the number of firms na,t, firm size sa,t and the survival rate 1-xa,t. However, 
firms older than 5 are grouped together in Eurostat. Hence, it is necessary to interpolate 
information for each of the individual age categories. Two inputs to the calculator are the 
profiles of average size and the survival rates by age in the baseline scenario (i.e. 
without shock), for firms up to age 15. For firms up to age 5, we measure directly in the 
data as averages over the sample period. For older firms, we assume a functional form 
for both profiles and fit these to the available data. Specifically, for the exit rate we 
assume the following functional form: 
 
𝑥$ = 𝛽' + 𝛽)
*+,-.
)/*+,-.
01)
. 
 
 
This implies a smooth profile, gradually decaying from an initial point 𝑥$2) = 𝛽' +𝛽) to a 
limit point 𝑥$→4 = 𝛽'.	The parameter 𝛽6	controls the speed of decay. 
Regarding the average size profile we assume a simple linear form: 
	
𝑛$ = 𝛾' + 𝛾)𝑎.	
	
The functional forms for these two profiles capture well patterns documented using data 
sets for which exit rates can be computed for all age groups (such as the US Longitudinal 
Business Database, see e.g. Pugsley, Sedláček and Sterk (2017). 
To estimate the parameters of these profiles we use a minimum distance estimator, 
targeting the following outcomes which we can observe in the data: (i) the average exit 
rate by age, for firms up to age 5, (ii) average size of firms by age, for firms up to age 5, 
(iii) the average exit rate among all firms, and (iv) average size among all firms. Note 
that given a profile for the exit rate by age, one can compute the firm age distribution, 
and then the average exit rate by weighting the exit rates by age with the firm shares in 
each age bin. Then, given the age distribution and the average size profile by age, one 
can compute average size across all firms. The estimation is implemented in MatLab. 
In order to extrapolate the necessary data between 2017 and 2019, we assume that firm 
size by age and exit rates by age (up to age 15), and the number of start-ups, all linearly 
converge to their 2008-2017averages: 
 
𝑥$,6');/< = 𝑥$,6'); +
<
6
𝑥$ − 𝑥$,6'); ,	
	
	𝑠$,6');/< = 𝑠$,6'); +
<
6
𝑠$ − 𝑠$,6'); ,	
	
𝑛',6');/< = 𝑛',6'); +
<
6
𝑛' − 𝑛',6'); .	
	
 
for	𝜏 = 1, 2 and a = 1, 2,…, 15, and where 𝑥$, 𝑠$, and 𝑛' denote the 2008 to 2017 
averages of age specific exit rates, firm sizes and the number of start-ups, respectively. 
Using the above, we can then recover the number of firms for the ages of 1 to 15 as 
𝑛$,@ = 𝑛$1),@1) 1 − 𝑥$,@ ,  for a = 1, 2, …, 15 and t = 2018, 2019.  
In order to compute aggregate employment, it is also necessary to assume a particular 
time-path for employment of 16+ year old firms. However, because 16+ year old firms 
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are unaffected by our scenarios, the particular time-path is quantitatively unimportant for 
the results which are reported in deviations from the assumed trend. For this reason, we 
simply assume that employment in 16+ year old firms stays fixed at its 2017 level. 
Having the above information, we are ready to conduct scenarios starting in 2020 and 
running through to 2030. We consider three types of margins: (i) changes in the number 
of start-ups, (ii) changes in growth potential and (iii) changes in survival rates. To be 
concrete, for a given scenario, let us denote the initial percentage decrease in the 
number of start-ups, the growth potential of start-ups and the survival rate of young 
firms by 𝜁C ∈ (0,1) where j = {n, s, x}, respectively. Let us further denote the duration of 
these effects by 𝜏C> 0, where j = {n, s, x}, respectively. The given scenarios are then 
given by: 
 
𝑛',6')G/@ = 𝑛',6')G 1 − 𝜁H , for	𝑡 = 1,… , 𝜏H, 
 
𝑠$,6')G/@/$ = 𝑠$,6')G 1 − 𝜁N , for	𝑡 = 1,… , 𝜏N		and	𝑎 = 0, 1, 2, … , 15, 
 
𝑥$,6')G/@ = 𝑥$,6')G 1 − 𝜁T , for	𝑡 = 1,… , 𝜏T		and	𝑎 = 1, 2, … , 15. 
 
The calculator can also accommodate bounce-back scenarios. These are always defined 
as certain values above the 2008-2017 averages of the number of start-ups, average 
sizes and survival rates of young firms. Recall that all these margins converge precisely 
to the respective 2008-2017 averages by 2019. 
Specifically, let us denote the percentage increase (above the respective long-run 
average) in the bounce-back scenario related to the number of start-ups, the growth 
potential of young firms and their survival rates by 𝜒C , where j = {n, s, x}, respectively. 
Furthermore, let us denote the length of the bounce-back period by 𝜏C, where j = {n, s, 
x}, respectively. The given bounce-back scenarios are then given by 
 
𝑛',6')G/<V/@ = 𝑛',6')G 1 − 𝜒H , for	𝑡 = 1,… , 𝜏H, 
 
𝑠$,6')G/<W/@/$ = 𝑠$,6')G 1 − 𝜒N , for	𝑡 = 1,… , 𝜏N		and	𝑎 = 0, 1, 2, … , 15, 
 
𝑥$,6')G/<X/@ = 𝑥$,6')G 1 − 𝜒T , for	𝑡 = 1,… , 𝜏T		and	𝑎 = 1, 2, … , 15. 
 
Appendix II. Adjusting for general equilibrium effects 
The calculator per se is an accounting tool that abstracts from potential general 
equilibrium effects. To capture the partial reallocation of labour towards surviving firm, 
the calculator is embedded in a canonical model with firm heterogeneity. In what follow, 
we briefly describe the model economy and it contribution to the calculator.  
In the model, there is a measure M of heterogeneous firms.33 Let the production 
function of firm i be given by: 
                                   
33 Although	the	model	is	dynamic,	it	can	be	described	entirely	in	static	terms,	hence	we	omit	time	subscripts.	
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𝑦Z = 𝑧Z𝑛Z0 
 
where 𝑦Z is the firm’s output, 𝑛Z its employment level, 𝑧Z is the firm’s productivity level, 
and 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of production with respect to labour input.34 The wage per 
employee is taken as given by firms, and denoted by w. The firm chooses its level of 
employment in order to maximize profits, given by 𝜋Z 𝑛 = 𝑧Z𝑛Z0	 − 𝑤𝑛Z. This implies 
the following familiar solution for labor demand by firm i: 
 
𝑛Z = (𝑧Z)
)
)10
𝑤
𝛼
)
01) 
	
Aggregating over all firms, aggregate labor demand is given by: 
 
N = 𝑀
𝑤
𝛼
)
01) 𝑧
)
)10𝑑𝐹(𝑧) 
 
where 𝜒 ≡ 𝑧
d
def𝑑𝐹(𝑧), with F is the CDF of the productivity distribution. Taking logs and 
differentiating (keeping idiosyncratic productivities constant), we can decompose changes 
in aggregate labour demand as: 
 
																																																										𝑑 ln 𝑁 = 		 𝑑 ln𝑀 + 𝑑 ln 𝜒 +
1
𝛼 − 1
𝑙𝑛	 𝑤	 																																																			(1) 
 
The first two terms reflect changes in, respectively, the number of firms and their growth 
potential (productivity), whereas the third term captures equilibrium effects due to wage 
conditions.35 Equation (1) can be understood as an aggregate labour demand curve, 
which is shifted by the number of firms and their growth potential. To close the model, 
we need to specify how labour supply is determined. We assume there is a 
representative household with Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffmann preferences. Specifically, 
the household’s level of utility is given by: 
 
U 𝐶, 𝑁 = 𝐶 − 𝜇
𝑁)/m
1 + 𝑘
)1o
 
 
where C denotes consumption and 𝜅, 𝜇, 𝜎 > 0 are preference parameters. The household 
chooses C and N to maximize utility, subject to a budget constraint given by 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑁 + Π, 
where Π are aggregate firm profits. Utility maximization implies the following labour 
supply curve: µ𝑁u = 𝑤. Taking logs and differentiating gives the labour supply schedule: 
 
																																																																													𝑑 ln 𝑁 = 		
1
𝜅
𝑙𝑛	 𝑤 																																																																																	(2) 
 
                                   
34 We abstract from capital for simplicity. Augmenting the model with capital would not change any of our 
results. 
35 Other sources of equilibrium dampening could derive from endogenous entry and exit, which we abstract 
from here.	
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Combining the labour demand and supply schedules, Equations (1) and (2), we can solve 
for the equilibrium level of aggregate employment: 
	𝑑 ln 𝑁 = 		𝜓	 𝑑 ln𝑀 + 𝑑 ln 𝜒 	(3)	
Equation (3) expresses aggregate employment (in deviation from some baseline trend) 
as a function of the number of firms and their growth potential. The latter two are 
outputs from the calculator, while 𝜓 = )
)1mxVy
∈ 0,1  is the equilibrium dampening effect, 
where 𝜀H{ =	
)
01)
is the wage elasticity of labour demand and 1/𝑘 is the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply. Based on these two parameters and the output from the calculator, we 
can thus compute the equilibrium change in aggregate employment from Equation (3). 
Using elasticities consistent with the literature and with the values adopted by the 
European Commission QUEST and RHOMOLO models, we set the labour supply elasticity, 
1/𝑘, at 0.25 and the labour demand elasticity, 𝜀H{, at -0.1. These elasticities result in a 
dampening effect of 29%.  
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